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In the wake of the mineral revolution, and the Cape Colony’s attainment of 
responsible government, Cape Town’s population doubled in the nineteenth cen-
tury’s latter years. Its largely British ruling class, seeing opportunities for wealth 
and a greater significance in empire and world, sought to construct a social 
order conducive to those goals. Faced with increasing ethnic heterogeneity, gen-
der imbalance due to the numbers of male immigrants, and frustration in com-
bating the endemic poverty and slums, city fathers and their closest colleagues 
– doctors, clergy – perceived the way forward in terms not of extending rights 
but of moral reform. This article carries the ongoing investigation of family life 
and law in Cape Town through the Victorian period. It examines legal enactments 
and social developments where they impacted on marriage, divorce, concubinage 
and related matters, with particular reference to the welfare of children and those 
born out of wedlock. 
This article contributes to a larger historical investigation of out-of-wedlock births 
in Cape Town from its beginning as an outpost of the Dutch East India Company. 
The near-two centuries when the fact of slavery was central to the history of ille-
gitimacy have been the subject of earlier research.1 Here the focus is on the mid- to 
late nineteenth century when patterns of sexual behaviour and family formation, 
shaped by that history, came under the scrutiny of policy-makers steeped in British 
traditions and jurisprudence.2 The essay asks to what extent the Cape’s family law 
was reshaped by the altered circumstances, and how the welfare of out-of-wedlock 
children and their parents (or caretakers) was affected.
Under Roman-Dutch law, ‘crimes of incontinence’ were defined as ‘adultery, 
polygamy or bigamy, rape, fornication, concubinage, sodomy, and incest’.3 The 
Company soon learned to treat its servants’ resort to concubinage as inevitable giv-
en the shortage of marriage partners, that is, of women from Europe. Numbers of 
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more rarely, with Cape indigenes. From the founding of the Cape settlement, the 
churches – exclusively, to begin, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) – partnered 
government as guardians of the colony’s morals. The DRC encouraged cohabiting 
couples to marry (possible only when both parties were baptised) and present their 
offspring for a Christian baptism.4 With the passage of time, and with gender parity 
amongst the settler population, the crime of adultery joined that of concubinage as 
a threat to stable families – perceived as the bedrock of well-ordered polities. 
The short-lived Dutch (‘Batavian’) government, which followed Britain’s 
first occupation of the Cape (1795–1803), enacted a measure facilitating secular 
marriage.5 On their return in 1806 the British reinstated marriage as a religious 
(specifically Christian) event. In 1818 the option of marriage by special licence 
was introduced; in 1829 the age of majority was lowered, from 25 to 21 – a change 
which freed a cohort of youths from parental control at the point of marriage.6 Po-
tentially of great significance were ordinances of 1823 and 1826 which permitted 
slaves to enter into legal marriage – if they were Christians. Few applicants pre-
sented themselves. The early decades of British rule were more remarkable for the 
rate at which slaves embraced Islam and sought marriage by Muslim rites despite 
the fact that such marriages lacked legality.7 By mid-century, crucial measures 
prompted by emancipation were in place. Britain’s Marriage Order-in-Council of 
1838 (in effect from 1 February 1839) had formalised certain slave unions as mar-
riage. It also eased access to that rite by authorising civil marriage officers.
The expanding hegemony of Britain touched the lives of Cape Town’s diverse 
peoples at many points. The DRC’s dominance in social and religious life gave 
way in face of the Anglicans, Methodists and others amongst the new officialdom 
and flow of immigrants.8 With the Charter of Justice (1828) English jurisprudence 
grew in influence.9 Until late in the century, judges schooled in English common 
law dominated the Cape Supreme Court, which replaced the old Court of Justice.10 
Chief Justice Wylde, who filled that office until 1855, defined the judiciary as 
protectors of ‘the great moral public interests of the local society’.11 The judges’ 
reflections on the merits of two merging legal systems provide insights into mind-
sets respecting morality, the status of women and children, and other aspects of 
family law. 
4 That campaign was compromised by irreconcilables respecting the law, as it pertained to slavery, and Christian precepts 
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6 V.C. Malherbe, ‘Illegitimacy and Family Formation in Colonial Cape Town, to c. 1850’, Journal of Social History, 39(4) 
(Summer 2006), 1156. A special licence dispensed with banns prior to marriage.
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9At the same time, popular participation in government was increasing – re-
flecting trends in Britain and elsewhere. In 1840, Cape Town attained municipal 
status: townsmen (but not women) were eligible to vote if they met the property 
qualifications fixed for the council’s two chambers. Early on, the councillors peti-
tioned Queen Victoria to grant representative government. In 1854 the first parlia-
ment met in Cape Town, making it ‘at once an imperial and a national capital’.12 
Just eighteen years later, when mineral discoveries in the interior were transform-
ing the economy and demography of southern Africa, the colony received respon-
sible government. From 1872, the developments to be explored occurred in the 
context of self-rule.
Marriage and Divorce
In the parlance of the time, men and women married as consenting individuals but 
were bound jointly by a ‘contract with society’: dissolving a marriage was seen as 
destroying a pillar ‘on which civilised society rests’.13 Governments and religions 
sought to channel sexual behaviour in directions both socially useful and condu-
cive to standards defined as ‘moral’. The institution of marriage has been central to 
matters such as property and succession, and to a rational ordering of reproduction 
to meet social needs: ‘a vehicle for the production of soldiers, sailors, workers and 
housewives’.14
In England ‘divorce meant adultery’.15 Cape judges recruited in Britain were 
uncomfortable with the Roman-Dutch law’s admission of malicious desertion as 
ground for divorce although it, like adultery, claimed biblical authority.16 In 1853 
Johannes le Roes sued Anna Wiehahn for restitution of conjugal rights – the man-
datory first step in divorce proceedings – after she ‘unlawfully and maliciously 
deserted’ him, alleging his violence and threats to her life.17 Justice Musgrave (who 
supported the finding for Wiehahn) lamented: ‘I have often expressed myself very 
strongly against the facility which is given to married persons in this country to 
obtain a divorce for malicious desertion.’ Whether the court ruled for plaintiff or 
defendant, either one could (by withholding restitution) gain the object of freeing 
themselves for ‘another connexion’.
Musgrave wished the new Cape parliament might place the law of divorce 
‘on a more satisfactory footing’ – apparently one which permitted judicial separa-
12 Worden et al, Cape Town, 171-75, 177. 
13 J. Buchanan, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope as reported by the Hon. William Menzies 
Esq. [hereafter Menzies Reports], 3 vols (Cape Town, 1870-1903), 1, 143; Searle, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 
3, 393.
14 H.R. Hahlo, ‘The Law of Concubinage’, South African Law Journal, 89, 1972, 330.
15 U. Vogel, ‘Whose Property? The Double Standard of Adultery in Nineteenth-century Law’ in C. Smart, ed, Regulating 
Womanhood, Historical Essays on Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality (London & New York, 1992), 160; M.L. Shanley, 
Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian England, 1850-1895 (London, 1989), 9, 174-6, 182-3; B. Clark, ‘History of 
the Roman-Dutch Law of Marriage from a Socio-Economic Perspective’ in D.P. Visser, ed, Essays on the History of Law 
(Cape Town, 1989), n 162, 179 & n 184, 181; H.R. Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife, 5th ed (Cape Town, 
1985), 12, n 75. 
16 Buchanan, ed, Menzies Reports, 1, 146; A.F.S. Maasdorp, C.A. Beck and O.H. Hoexter, eds, The Institutes of South African 
Law, being a Compendium of the Common Law, Decided Cases, and Statute Law of the Union of South Africa, 4 vols (Cape 
Town & Johannesburg, 1929), 1, 88-103.
17 ‘A.J.F’, ‘Malicious Desertion’ in R.B. Howes and T.G. Duncan, eds, South African Law Journal together with Index and 
Table of Cases (Cape Town, 1924), 41, 38-44; Clark, ‘Roman-Dutch Law of Marriage’, 180-1.
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tion but preserved an unhappy couple’s marriage.18 Here too, the Roman-Dutch 
tradition afforded relief more generously than the law of Britain where, at the time 
in question, divorce a mensa et thoro which revoked the duty to share bed and 
board (but did not end the marriage) was the province of ecclesiastical courts.19 At 
the Cape a legal separation was available through notaries or courts of law.20
In practice, resort to the legal remedies in cases of breakdown in relationships 
was erratic. In 1843, after two years of marriage, Henry Farmer of Cape Town left 
Elizabeth van Wielligh and went to England. Shortly after, she – being ‘ill pro-
vided for’ – formed ‘a criminal connexion’ with Frederick Watson whom she mar-
ried, ‘representing herself as a widow’. When Farmer returned (1852) he secured 
a divorce, citing her adultery.21 A judge asked if, in granting such divorces, the 
court had been faithful to the ‘principles of morality and public policy by which it 
guides itself’.22
At more or less the same time Peter Seaward, whose wife had left him for 
‘one Africa’ after a period ‘in a common brothel’, secured a divorce. Considering 
Farmer and Seaward, the Chief Justice lamented that ‘parties in the lower classes’ 
too often and too easily secured divorces. Justice Bell – another ready critic of 
Cape law – echoed concerns respecting ‘persons of that rank of life’.23 Such judg-
ments reflected the court’s deep consciousness of social hierarchy – above and be-
yond the assessment of ‘rank, social position, and education’ deemed appropriate 
when awarding damages.24 
Judges regretted the ‘monstrous’ local provision allowing plaintiffs as much 
as a third of a century in which to seek a remedy.25 The court’s concern was not, 
however, for persons thus consigned to a marital limbo. Contemplating Mrs Farm-
er, Bell observed:
 
… it is good English as well as Dutch law that a woman compelled 
by her husband to live apart from him, must return to those moral 
restraints which she was obliged before marriage to impose upon her-
self, and is not entitled to justify by his conduct, the prostitution of her 
person and mind …26 
Of Mrs Seaward (seemingly the erring partner) counsel argued: ‘Total ne-
18 Searle, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 2, 14.
19 J.M. Masson, R. Bailey-Harris & R.J. Probert, eds, Cretney Principles of Family Law, 8th edition (London: Sweet & Max-
well, 2008), 282; M. Freeman, Understanding Family Law (London, 2007), 113, 324.
20 ‘A.J.F’, ‘Malicious Desertion’, 41, 41. According to Hahlo, ‘the effect of a separation agreement, formal or informal, de-
pended largely upon whether or not it had been entered into justa causa, that is to say, in circumstances which would have 
justified a judicial decree of separation’, Law of Husband and Wife, 5th ed, 321. Britain’s Divorce Act of 1857 aligned that 
system more closely with Roman-Dutch practice, but persons – women, generally – in failed marriages secured a decree 
with difficulty, Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law, 44, 169-74. For consequences respecting legitimacy, see L. 
Stone, Road to Divorce, England 1530-1987 (Oxford University Press, 1990), 180. See also the Matrimonial Causes Act of 
1878.
21 Searle, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 1, 227-8; Cape Town Archives Repository [hereafter CAR], Cape Supreme 
Court [hereafter CSC] 1/10/1/3, Entries of Judgments, 1848-1868, Records in Civil Cases, 1852.
22 Searle, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 1, 232.
23 Ibid., 1, 228-9, 248.
24 C.H. van Zyl, ‘The Theory of the Judicial Practice: Divorce’, in W.H.S. Bell, ed, The Cape Law Journal (Grahamstown, 
1893), 7, 216.
25 Farmer v F., Searle, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 1, 232-4.
26 Ibid., 1, 231.
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glect by the husband of the wife would be no bar [to his right to divorce] …’ Mrs 
Farmer’s predicament – abandoned, indigent, and required to revert to maiden-like 
chastity – seems not to have figured in Justice Bell’s dictum that Cape law resulted 
in ‘sin and confusion to society’.27
The law required that plaintiffs seeking a divorce were ‘pure’ not only when 
the suit ‘is commenced, but during the whole course of the proceedings’: if they 
were themselves adulterers, or committed adultery while suing a spouse for that 
offence, the case was dismissed.28 Did the court investigate Farmer and Seaward’s 
behaviour while apart from their wives? Nothing to that effect was recorded. A 
century later the law was unchanged, resulting in ‘the absurd situation where two 
adults both of whom have committed adultery … remain bound to each other as 
punishment for their misconduct’.29 
And what of children? A man named as father of a bastard might, for exam-
ple, admit paternity and blame poverty for his failure to marry, or deny paternity on 
grounds that the woman was promiscuous.30 Appearing before the DRC council, 
Arie de Melker denied that he misled Christina Verwey with a promise of mar-
riage: she had ‘known other men’ – were she respectable he would marry her. 
Verwey insisted, without success, that he was the only man whom she had known 
sexually.31 Women less hopeful that their word would prevail may have shrunk 
from that sort of exposure. Fathers were responsible for child support, to age 16, 
and the churches urged men towards that duty; sogesegde fathers like De Melker 
could evade those pressures. A woman could sue for damages and/or maintenance 
but such initiatives appear unusual. Occasionally the shoe was on the other foot: a 
man claiming breach who sued for £500 was awarded a shilling – a sign, it seems, 
that his suit was deemed frivolous.32
The Marriage Order-in-Council had also enabled ‘any person desirous of 
marriage’ to lodge an appeal when parties (usually parents) attempted to block it. 
Where legitimation of a child was at stake, the court ruled generally for the ap-
pellant. An exception occurred when Michael Whelan, a Catholic, petitioned to 
set aside his parents’ objections and marry a Protestant – apparently a woman of 
colour – who was pregnant with his child. On unspecified grounds, the court ruled 
against him and the child was presumably born out of wedlock.33 It appears that 
issues of faith and/or race were decisive.
Though so much hung on strict procedures – the legality of marriages and 
legitimacy of the offspring, succession and the right to property – there were loop-
holes. In 1886 just 53 Christian ministers, of the ‘mainline’ churches, appeared on 
the Civil Service List; yet 364 were styled as such in Cape Town’s General Direc-
27 Seaward v S., ibid., 1, 248. 
28 Heathershaw v H., ibid., 5, 36; C.G. Hall, ed, 4 vols, Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law, 9th edition, 1. The Law 
of Persons, 73. 
29 J.D. Petersen, ‘Divorce Law Reform’ in E. Kahn, ed, South African Law Journal (Cape Town, 1971), 88, 480. 
30 The Order-in-Council of 1838 had terminated forced marriage for breach of promise – already abandoned at the Cape in 
practice, H.R. Hahlo, The South African Law of Husband and Wife, 2nd ed (Cape Town: Juta & Co. Limited, 1963), 46-7, 
562; K. McKenzie, ‘Wollstonecraft’s Models?: Female Honour and Sexuality in Middle-Class Settler Cape Town, 1800-
1854’, Kronos: Journal of Cape History, 23, 1996, 57-74.
31 Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk Argief [hereafter NGKA], G1 1/29, Notulen, Dec. 1864. In court, the man’s denial would 
prevail over uncorroborated evidence respecting paternity. 
32 Mocke v Fouche, in Bell, ed, The Cape Law Journal, 10, 315.
33 CAR, CSC 8/1/1, n. 40, 14 March 1874.
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tory. Apparently another 311 ‘exercise the function of marriage officers – who are 
wholly unknown to government’. What, then, of enforcement of the legal require-
ments such as banns, parental rights over minors, or proofs respecting degrees of 
consanguinity? Here again, race and class were factors: respecting ‘natives and 
half castes in town’, surely it was ‘undesirable to allow their union by a catechist, 
evangelist, or local preacher’. Parliament, it was argued, should legislate so that 
the clergy – like doctors, land surveyors, attorneys – be required to register in order 
to serve as marriage officers.34 It had, in fact, attempted to do so a decade earlier 
but complications cited by churchmen had persuaded it to drop the measure.35
Anomalies arose from the fact that legal marriage was construed as a Chris-
tian event, with civil marriage an option for Jews and Muslims who desired legal-
ity. Respecting its competence ‘to take a Malay wife’s evidence … against her hus-
band’ – were the marriage legal, her evidence was inadmissible – the court found 
that, being unable to determine ‘whether the parties were legally married’, it could 
do no other than impose a token sentence.36 Soetje Magmoet tried to register a 
deed without her husband: pointing out that their marriage was not legal, Magmoet 
rejected his coverture (in law, his authority or ‘protection’). The court ruled that 
she had described herself as married: it was not the registrar’s job to establish le-
gality.37 Such decisions, where the court seemed to improvise, were significant for 
a large (if not commensurately powerful) segment of Cape Town’s population.38
The Victorians’ view of marriage – its purpose and practice – reflected con-
temporary interpretations of its ancient sources in Judeo-Christian scripture and 
Greco-Roman law and philosophy. Morality and respectability, protection of prop-
erty and inheritance, gender hierarchy and parental power – all bulwarks of a stable 
society – were seen by a growing middle-class to reside in monogamous unions 
which were both religious in character and of unimpeachable legality.
The Crimes of Concubinage and Fornication
‘No doubt because South Africans are a moral people, there are not many cases on 
concubinage in our law.’ That assertion (made as late as 1972) must surprise at first 
glance. The author identified two types of concubinage: unmarried cohabitation, 
when reasonably stable, and marriages shown to be invalid. The key words are ‘in 
our law’: neither the Roman-Dutch nor the English tradition had a ‘law of concu-
binage’; indeed, ‘family law all but ignored cohabitation’, which began without 
banns or licence and ended without divorce.39 Under the circumstances, the claims 
34 Bell, ed, Cape Law Journal, 3, 121-3. The List named seventeen Anglicans, twenty-nine DRC clergy, five Roman Catholics, 
and one each of the Lutheran and Scottish Churches. Other professionals registered under the Stamp Act 20 of 1884.
35 Votes and Proceedings of Parliament, Session 1875, Report of the Select Committee ... Marriage Law Amendment Bill, 
Appendix II (Cape Town, 1875), 1, iii-vii, 1-5; Index to Bills, Index to the Annexures and Printed Papers of the House of 
Assembly … 1854 to 1897 (Cape Town, 1899), xxi.
36 Queen v Lodewyk, 24 June 1884, J. Buchanan and E.J. Buchanan, eds, Cases Decided in the Court of Appeal of the Cape 
of Good Hope … 1880 to 1884 (Johannesburg, 1973), 365-7. The Cape’s Court of Appeal had a brief existence (1879-86), 
H. Corder, ‘The Judicial Branch of Government: An Historical Overview’, in Visser, ed, Essays on the History of Law, 62.
37 Soetje Magmoet v Registrar of Deeds, 19 July 1887, H. Juta, ed, Reports of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape 
of Good Hope (Johannesburg, 1973), 5, 179-80. 
38 Malherbe, ‘Christian-Muslim Marriage and Cohabitation’, 5-24. Act 60 of 1860 To Amend the Law concerning Marriages, 
whereby Jewish and Muslim clergy were appointed as marriage officers, appears not to have served to clarify these cases.
39 Freeman, Understanding Family Law, 47; Hahlo, ‘Law of Concubinage’, South African Law Journal, 89, 321.
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of cohabiters seldom reached the courts. In 1878 the Cape Supreme Court awarded 
damages for seduction and maintenance from the estate of a man who, while liv-
ing, had supported his concubine and their child.40 The outcome appears to have 
rested on a rare absence of rival claimants and on unassailable proofs of the plain-
tiff’s and child’s relationship with the deceased. 
Though we lack statistics, it may be said that unwed cohabitation flourished 
in Cape Town, owing not only to the presence there of slave descendants whose 
forebears were excluded from legal marriage, but to the fact that the city was a 
busy seaport and home to successive military garrisons. Casual and longer-term 
sexual liaisons produced many out-of-wedlock births. Such offspring might be 
reared by single mothers or in families, albeit in an environment of poverty, insta-
bility or strife. In cases of abandonment the church placed foundlings with foster 
parents when no offers of adoption were received; the nineteenth century’s faith-
based homes for orphans and others in need of care often excluded bastards.41 
Side by side with those phenomena were the rituals whereby the youth (daughters, 
specifically) of the more privileged classes were steered towards proper and timely 
marriage to avoid a sexual lapse. Such precautions were never foolproof and it 
was claimed that not a few men of substance chose to flee the colony ‘when their 
children have disgraced them’.42
Testifying before the Law of Inheritance Commission (1866), Charles Bell 
claimed that immoral behaviour by persons known to the commissioners (the ‘re-
spectable’ class) was covered up: ‘I will not drag skeletons from the dark corners 
of households where they have long been carefully concealed,’ he declared before 
denouncing the measures which, he believed, provoked decent men to weigh the 
costs of marriage versus support of ‘a faithful concubine of the better class’.43 Bell 
may have had in mind his (former) brother-in-law, John Ebden, who did not marry 
and left his worldly goods to his mistress – earlier the mistress of another well-con-
nected Capetonian – and their three out-of-wedlock children.44 As the father (di-
vorced) of several children, Bell declared that he risked ‘the foul tongues of Cape 
scandalmongers’ should he bring a governess into his house; equally injurious was 
the fact that his children, being legitimate, compromised his resources should he 
remarry – not the case were they born out of wedlock.45 Without conceding that 
the law gave an excuse for concubinage, the Commission proposed the repeal of 
provisions which prejudiced remarriage.46
Sexual transactions in Cape Town’s canteens and public spaces went largely 
unhindered unless the constables surprised fornicators, or the drinking dens too 
brazenly incorporated brothels. Prostitution was not a criminal offence but ‘[k]
40 Kramer v Findlay’s Executors, E.J. Buchanan, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of the Cape of Good Hope during 
the Year 1878 (Johannesburg, 1973), 51-2. 
41 Legal adoption came with the Act of 1923. Prior to that, ‘adoption’ was a form of fostering. For an exception regarding the 
exclusion of bastards, see E. Bradlow, ‘“The Oldest Charitable Society in South Africa”: One Hundred Years and More of 
the Ladies’ Benevolent Society at the Cape of Good Hope’, South African Historical Journal 25, 1991, 86.
42 Report of the Law of Inheritance Commission into Inheritance for the Western Districts – G.15 - ‘65 (Cape Town, 1866), 
228-9.
43 Ibid., 186, 187. 
44 G. Richings, ‘Charles Bell’s Divorce: The Legal Aftermath’, Quarterly Bulletin of the National Library of South Africa, 
54(3), 2000, 110; P. Simons, Old Mutual, 1845-1995 (Cape Town, 1995), 29.
45 Report of the Law of Inheritance Commission, 235. 
46 Ibid., xi-xii, xxv. 
14
eeping a disorderly house or brothel to the … common nuisance of the neigh-
bourhood’ was actionable and, periodically, Parliament and the municipality upped 
their efforts to control soliciting, pimping and procuration.47 Of the poor’s survival 
strategies, prostitution was most deplored but eluded control by the law. 
In 1868, a Contagious Diseases Act based on British legislation set out to 
identify prostitutes as the source of infection, of men in general and the military 
in particular.48 Opposition mounted against a measure perceived as forced upon 
the Colony by the imperial power for the sake of its garrison. A leading opponent 
pointed out that Cape Town with a small population (30,000) plus 800 to 1000 
soldiers had 409 registered prostitutes compared with Britain’s garrison cities, for 
example Aldershot with 9790 soldiers and 248 prostitutes. Was Cape Town more 
immoral? Might the fact that the Medical Inspector received 5s. for each name 
added to the register create a ‘government establishment for the manufacture of 
“common prostitutes”’?49 The Contagious Diseases Act was repealed but its ar-
ray of powers lingered in the official mind. By comparison the alternative tool, 
the Public Health Act, lacked teeth; it did not, for example, allow the compul-
sory examination of women suspected of syphilis.50 Again, Cape Town was said to 
teem with prostitutes – a label which lawmakers failed to define.51 Just as England 
moved to abolish its Contagious Diseases Act, the Cape Parliament saw fit to pass 
a new Act.52 Opponents in Britain were disgusted and their journal, The Shield, 
warned women against emigrating to the Cape where the measure was in force.53
One consequence of Britain’s Contagious Diseases Act was the attention fo-
cused there on the ‘double standard’ which oppressed women. Where a woman 
could be divorced for one act of adultery, a married man, without risk to his mar-
riage, could access ‘clean’ prostitutes – the gift of an all-male Parliament. If care-
less, he brought disease to a wife unaware of his extra-marital activities, and on 
whom he was free to force himself. A Cape Town wife secured a divorce when 
she was infected and her husband was found with ‘veneral [sic] disease long after 
marriage’ – construed by the court as ‘prima facie evidence of adultery’ when he 
failed to prove that his condition was a relapse from ante-nuptial infection.54 Did 
her suit require a particular measure of courage? A question for historians has been 
the general passivity of Cape Town’s women respecting affronts to their status and 
wellbeing at a time when their British sisters were campaigning for equality in 
response to the Contagious Diseases Act and other crass discrimination.55
47 Queen v Ana Paulse, 1 Sept. 1892, Bell, ed, Cape Law Journal, 9, 243; Act 44 of 1898 Police Offences Amendment Act. 
48 For the Act’s terms, see E.B. van Heyningen, ‘The Social Evil in the Cape Colony 1868-1902: Prostitution and the Conta-
gious Diseases Acts’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 10(2), 1984, 171 and passim. 
49 S. Solomon, The Contagious Diseases Act: its operation at the Cape of Good Hope: four letters to the editors of the Cape 
Argus (Cape Town, 1870), 18, 19, 39.
50 Van Heyningen, ‘The Social Evil’, 178-9; Queen v Cornelia and Sanna, Cape Law Journal, 1, 43.
51 H.J. Self, Prostitution, Women and Misuse of the Law: The Fallen Daughters of Eve (London & Portland, Or., 2003), 25, 
41, 53. 
52 Act 39 of 1885, Van Heyningen, ‘The Social Evil’, 178.
53 V. Bickford-Smith, E. van Heyningen and N. Worden, Cape Town in the Twentieth Century: An Illustrated Social History 
(Cape Town, 1999), 25; Van Heyningen, ‘The Social Evil’, 194. The Contagious Diseases Act of 1885 was repealed only in 
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Though regarded as heinous, other ‘crimes of incontinence’ – rape, sodomy, 
incest – came less often to notice and were commensurately less threatening to the 
social order than were concubinage and casual sex. A male could not be prosecuted 
for rape if he was under fifteen years of age nor if, when married, he forced ‘con-
jugal rights’ on an unwilling wife (marital rape was not deemed an offence until 
1991).56 The youth of a girl (her age not given) was the sole factor inclining Attor-
ney-General William Porter to consider charging a man for ‘indecently uncovering 
the person of the [sleeping] girl, and laying himself upon her body, and seeking to 
have carnal connection with her’: supposing she were ‘precocious in vice’, there 
was nothing ‘safe to treat as Rape’ and the man though a ‘scoundrel’ had commit-
ted no crime.57 The Attorney-General appeared most concerned to protect the man 
against a false charge. At the century’s end, juries not satisfied that the sexual as-
sault of a girl aged 14 to 16 equalled rape, or intention to rape, were permitted to 
frame a lesser charge before delivering sentence.58
The Crime of Adultery
Now and then the Cape’s records mirror travesties such as those that pepper A.P. 
Herbert’s Holy Deadlock. When Mrs Robinson hired a private detective for proofs 
of her husband’s infidelity, the sleuth ‘saw a man resembling the defendant commit 
adultery with the woman as charged’. In the view of the court:
It is no connivance in the adultery on the part of plaintiff if the private 
detective on seeing the woman in the street tells her to go up the street 
and she might find someone to consort with her, but had nothing to 
do with actually bringing the parties together. Any procuration … to 
induce the defendant to commit adultery would be sufficient ground to 
refuse a divorce.59
Robinson had confessed but a defendant’s admission was insufficient to se-
cure a decree – hence the resort to this charade.
High-profile divorces for adultery occurred in Cape Town.60 Martha Bell 
(born Ebden), wife of the Surveyor-General Charles Bell, and army doctor Lestock 
Wilson Stewart were found guilty despite her strenuous denials. In the words of a 
Cape legal scholar:
Direct evidence of … adultery is, of course, very rare, and is never 
required … there must be such positive proof … to make the presump-
56 Clark, ‘Roman-Dutch Law of Marriage’, 179-80; Bell, ed, Cape Law Journal, 11, 231-32; Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, 
9, 80, 84-5.
57 CAR, Attorney General [hereafter AG] 2158, Letter Book, 15 July 1847-1851, Porter–W. Vowe, 10 Jan. 1850, 295-6.
58 Articles 1 and 5, Criminal Law Amendment Act 25 of 1893. 
59 Robinson v R., 10 Aug. 1894, The Cape Law Journal, 11, 279.
60 In 1836 Chief Justice Wylde divorced the wife he had left behind in New South Wales a decade earlier, a spectacle preceded 
by a cause célèbre respecting rumours of incest with his daughter, see K. McKenzie, Scandal in the Colonies, Sydney & 
Cape Town, 1820-1850 (Carlton, Vic., 2004), 41-5; K. McKenzie, ‘Women’s Talk and the Colonial State: The Wylde Scan-
dal, 1831-1833’, Gender & History, 11(1), 1999, 30-53; Buchanan, ed, Menzies Reports, 1: 272; CAR, CSC 2/1/1/33, No. 
17 (16B), 1836, Sir John Wylde v Jane Elizabeth Wylde.
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tion probable … the parties having been found very near each other, 
and apparently surprised, rising hastily, dress discomposed, one run-
ning one way and the other another, confusion, hesitancy, embarrass-
ment, are strong evidence of guilt, especially if the circumstances can-
not be satisfactorily explained by them.61 
Bell was awarded damages, dissolution, and custody of three children in-
cluding their infant daughter, Catherine, with whom Ebden pleaded ‘she will not 
part’.62
Of Cape Town’s women, Edna Bradlow asserted: ‘The most serious challenge 
to the male-dominated order was … adultery’ – a blow to the locus of respectabil-
ity, the family. Charles Bell’s loss in terms of injury to family honour and to prop-
erty was valued at £500 in damages.63 Half a century had elapsed since Lady Anne 
Barnard’s rollicking account of a Mrs Baumgardt’s adulteries with high-ranking 
Britons at the Cape, which seemed to bear no serious consequences.64 If social 
mores grew more rigid from mid-century, some middle-class wives yet dared to 
defy them. Johanna Tiesman, wife of the DRC clergyman Emmanuel de Roubaix, 
bore the child of a man not named and embarked on a second adultery with Charles 
Schutte.65 Was Tiesman’s search for a new partner a self-validating challenge to 
the social order – the possibility at which Bradlow hinted? De Roubaix secured a 
divorce and remarried. Of speedy remarriage, Bell would remark: ‘in this colony 
few healthy men can live alone and be thought chaste’.66 
A plaintiff’s success in securing a divorce might hinge on whether he ‘con-
nived at his wife’s misconduct or exposed her unavoidably to pollution’ – a strata-
gem resorted to by some in pursuit of dissolution of a marriage.67 Once satisfied 
that the parties were legally married, and the defendant an adulterer,68 the judges 
determined if the plaintiff colluded by his ‘mental assent’ (and not ‘mere inaction’) 
in the behaviour complained of.69 Friends, landlords, relatives and servants – in-
cluding, prior to 1838, slaves – might be called upon to testify where connivance 
was suspected.70 For so long as divorce depended narrowly on fault, the court and 
determined escapees from wedlock played at cat and mouse.71
 As numerous as were marriage partners whose behaviour hinted at col-
lusion, there were also numbers who clung to marriage against the wishes of an 
unfaithful spouse: ‘Over and over again an innocent husband or wife is known to 
purposely abstain from availing himself or herself of the legal remedy … because 
61 Van Zyl, ‘Divorce’, Cape Law Journal, 7, 206.
62 CAR, CSC 2/1/1/64, May-June Term, 1850, Nos. 24 and 25. In 1860, Governor Sir George Grey separated from his wife 
on grounds of her overtures to a fellow passenger (apparently unconsummated) while sailing to the Cape. They remained 
estranged but did not divorce.
63 Bradlow, ‘Women at the Cape’, 58. 
64 M. Lenta and B. le Cordeur, eds, The Cape Diaries of Lady Anne Barnard, 1799-1800, 2 vols (Cape Town, 1999), 1, 35-6. 
65 CAR, CSC 2/1/1/65, Records … Supreme Court, 1850, No. 47.
66 Report of the Law of Inheritance Commission, 235.
67 Ibid., 1, 230, 232, 248. 
68 Buchanan, ed, Menzies Reports, 1, 262-5, 267-8, 281.
69 C.G. Hall, ed, 4 vols, Maasdorp’s Institutes of South African Law, 9th edition, 1. The Law of Persons, 75; Van Zyl, ‘Di-
vorce’, Cape Law Journal, 7, 209 and 8, 13.
70 De Wet v De W. (1833) where concubitus might have been proved ‘by servants or slaves in the house’, Buchanan, ed, 
Menzies Reports, 1, 269.
71 Petersen, ‘Divorce Law Reform’, 88, 479.
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the divorce … would be an event desired by the guilty parties.’ While the motive 
imputed was revenge or malice, considerations such as financial support and the 
welfare of children, or hope of reconciliation, may have played a part.72
Adulteries not aired in a court of law often came to the notice of the churches. 
At age fourteen Geertruida Destroo – still just a child (om zoo te spreken nog 
een kind) – had married Christiaan Adriaansen. He abandoned her, and Johannes 
Greijbe came to her rescue. Destroo’s self-perception as a child-bride was the ver-
dict of her middle age: girls of 12 (and boys of 14) had attained the legal age of 
marriage.73 Six of Destroo and Greijbe’s children were baptised by the English 
Church; her wish to have the seventh christened where she herself had been bap-
tised had brought her to the DRC. Destroo wished to marry Greijbe but could not 
afford to pursue a divorce. Both men appeared before the council – Adriaansen to 
justify himself, Greijbe to affirm his wish to marry.74 
It is not clear if the churches advised those too poor to employ legal counsel 
that the court, if satisfied respecting need, might hear their cases. James Lissenbury 
won his suit for divorce ‘as a pauper’, declaring he had not £10 ‘in this World save 
and except wearing apparel’.75 Sarah Cooper, also granted pauper status, named her 
husband’s partner in adultery but failed to prove her case.76 Reformers argued that 
those not approved to sue in forma pauperis were doomed to ‘misery or immoral-
ity’. The number of actions increased when costs were cut (in 1885) by streamlin-
ing the legal process. Soon the court complained that pauper suits were becoming 
‘an abuse at the expense of the country’.77 The choice – to consult the law, or to air 
a problem before one’s church officers – depended by and large on economics. 
Although no instance has been found, the churches must have advised adul-
terers that, were they divorced and free to remarry, the law proscribed their marry-
ing each other. In 1840, Attorney-General Porter had noted:
I am of opinion that the Dutch law, differing from the English … for-
bids any marriage between parties who have been guilty of adultery. 
Whether the injured party have been divorced for unfaithfulness of the 
consort, or have died in ignorance, or divorced for other cause, no legal 
marriage can be solemnized between guilty parties.78
When Petrus Lerm appealed to marry Maria Smith, after his divorce for their 
adultery, Porter advised: 
A marriage dissolved for Adultery leaves behind it an incapacity upon 
the part of the guilty spouse to contract a legal marriage with the par-
72 ‘Crim. Con.’, Cape Law Journal, 5, 190-91.
73 Hahlo, Law of Husband and Wife, 5th ed, 17. The ages were raised only in 1935.
74 NGKA, G1 1/28, Notulen, 4 Nov. 1861, 190, 2 Dec. 1861, 198-200, and Jan. 1862.
75 CAR, CSC 2/1/1/65, Records, Judicial Cases in the Supreme Court, 1850, No. 42; CSC 2/10/1/3, Entries of Judgments 
1848-1868, see 1850-March 1852.
76 CAR, CSC 2/10/1/3, ibid.
77 Ex parte Patrick Murphy, 12 July 1894 in Bell, ed, Cape Law Journal, 12, 206; C. Leonard, ‘Law Reform – Divorce’, Cape 
Law Journal, 1, 80-3; Rule 371, New Rules of Court, 22 July 1885, ibid., 2, 210, and ibid., 4, 74.
78 CAR, AG 2616, Report Book, 4 Feb. 1840, note in front of volume. English law permitted adulterers who were free to do 
so to marry. See also the Deserted Wives and Children’s Protection Act 7 of 1895.
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amour. The ground of the law … seems to be, to remove from the 
criminal parties one temptation to compass the death of the injured 
spouse.79 
On the face of it, the law which denied Lerm’s appeal might equally have 
encouraged thwarted lovers to act upon any murderous instincts. It remained in 
force until 1919 when the Appellate Division of the Union of South Africa ruled 
that, ‘as adultery has ceased to be a crime’, that provision had lapsed.80
Rigid as the law appeared, relief was not wholly out of the question. The 
courts had ‘the power to condone the plaintiff’s adultery by weighing up the re-
spective blameworthiness of the parties’.81 The church, too, had means of regu-
larising adulterous relationships. Johanna Prins, wife of Robert Barns, asked the 
DRC to baptise her child by a certain George Rose. Barns had gone to Australia 
where, she believed, he had taken a wife – confirmed in due course by a sworn 
statement. Bigamists could evade the law by flitting between metropoles and col-
onies.82 If not discovered where he resided, Barns need not be inconvenienced, 
but Prins could neither free herself by an order presuming his death nor afford 
a divorce.83 In the circumstances, the DRC requested a ruling by its mentors in 
the Netherlands (den Hollandschen Conseil).84 The Conseil’s reply has not been 
found but the inquiry suggests that dispensations were available where ‘morality’ 
was the prize. 
Adulterers contrived to marry despite assertions that it was ‘absolutely im-
possible’. An authority stated:
I am aware of many instances in this Colony where the parties who 
have committed adultery have, on the dissolution of the former mar-
riage, married each other, and that this is connived at, and in many 
cases even encouraged by others as well as by clergymen, on the 
ground that it would be better they should be married rather than 
openly live in a state of adultery. But whoever does so marry is liable 
to the penalties of the Placaaten [18 July 1674] which are still in force 
with us.85
Remembering Cape Town’s many ‘fringe’ clergy who conducted marriages, 
this assertion seems plausible. A judge regretted the harm done to children of 
adulterers, who succeeded against the odds in marrying, were the parents to be 
forced to part. Parliament, he submitted, should revoke a misguided measure.86 
If illegitimacy was, in particular, a product of 180 years of slavery, it also owed 
something to legalities which prejudiced marriage. Provisions that penalised the 
79 CAR, AG 2616, 26 Aug. 1843, 226; see also AG 2619, 9 Jan. 1851, 76.
80 Estate Heinemann and others v H., Maasdorp, Beck and Hoexter, eds, The Institutes of South African Law, 19.
81 Clark, ‘Roman-Dutch Law of Marriage’, 179 and ibid., n. 162.
82 Such evasions were less likely to succeed with improvements in long-distance communications. (W. Stoney, ‘Can a De-
serted Spouse, without having obtained a divorce, apply to the court for leave to re-marry?’, Cape Law Journal, 12, 176. 
83 NGKA, G1 1/28, Notulen, 5 Nov. 1860, 38-9 & 3 Dec. 1860, 53.
84 NGKA, G1 1/28, Notulen, 14 Jan. 1861, 70.
85 Van Zyl, ‘Divorce’, Cape Law Journal, 7, 213; Daniel v D., 19 Dec. 1884, H. Juta, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court 
of the Cape of Good Hope during the years 1884-5 (Johannesburg, 1973), 3, 234.
86 Juta, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court, 3, 232.
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children of adulterers rested on the anxiety that relaxation equalled an invitation 
to immorality.87 
Women and the ‘Public Interests’ of Society
Victorian women remained subject to coverture: the ‘first dent in the monolithic 
marital power of the husband’ came with South Africa’s Matrimonial Affairs Act 
of 1953.88 An important argument against divorce was that it deprived a husband 
‘of all legal control over his wife’; where there was adultery, that control ‘if once 
abolished … is often transferred to the adulterer, however illegal such a course 
may be’.89 An abandoned wife who remarried in good faith – when, say, five years 
had passed without news of the absent spouse or his whereabouts – could be forced 
to return to him should he appear and claim her as his ‘right’. The safer if more 
expensive option was to pave the way to remarriage by first securing a divorce 
for malicious desertion.90 At the end of the century it was regretted that divorce 
actions were increasing steadily. Had it not, it was asked, become ‘a little too 
easy’, when one considered that divorce went ‘to the root of the social life of any 
community’?91
The language of patriarchy found full expression at the Cape: ‘The tendency 
of advancing civilization is to elevate the status of women’ towards ‘greater inde-
pendence and responsibility’. Transparently, male tutelage was central to that proj-
ect.92 Jurists were mindful that women’s ‘honour, purity and chastity are too deli-
cate flowers to trifle with’ and must be ‘sacredly regarded’.93 Middle-class women 
acknowledged the status, relative to the men in their lives, which law and tradi-
tion conferred on them. When the colony resisted Britain’s plan to land convicts 
(ticket-of-leave men) at the Cape, the ‘Females of Hottentots Holland’ addressed 
Queen Victoria on behalf of their ‘Husbands, Fathers, Brothers, Sons … by whose 
toil we are supported, by whose love we are cheered, and by whose opinions we 
are guided’.94 While patriarchy amongst the ‘respectable’ was graced by lofty sen-
timent, women of ‘the poorer classes’ were liable to be held responsible for the 
shocking indigence, child mortality and neglect which put the society’s future at 
risk.95 
Dependants suffered an egregious setback in the wake of the Inheritance 
Commission’s report, referred to earlier. The Commission started by extolling the 
Roman-Dutch law’s respect (‘to a reasonable extent’) for the ‘equality of the sex-
es’: in England, a man was entitled to ‘leave all his fortune to his kept mistress and 
87 Petersen, ‘Divorce Law Reform’, 481. Statistics respecting the rate of illegitimacy were only available after the Act to 
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91 Cape Law Journal, 10, 285-6.
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let his minor children and their mother go to the workhouse’; at the Cape a surviv-
ing spouse married in community of property was assured of a share of the estate 
regardless of his wishes.96 Though both systems treated a wife as a minor,97 Cape 
widows and orphans could not be left destitute at a man’s pleasure. 
Despite its appearance of pride in the colony’s liberality, the Commission 
recommended repeal of the lex hac edictali which ‘prevented a spouse giving to 
a second or later wife, either by gift or bequest, more than the least share given to 
a child by the former marriage’.98 In 1873 the Cape’s new responsible parliament 
passed the Law of Inheritance Amendment Act which asserted a husband’s right 
to disinherit without giving reasons (followed, in 1874, by the Succession Act). 
Regretting these measures, a full century later, the jurist H.R. Hahlo commented: 
‘Unrestricted freedom of testation was in conformity with the ethos of the English 
upper middle class of the late nineteenth century.’99 
Britain’s law respecting bastardy had for long been linked with the so-called 
Poor Law. In 1834, an unwed mother’s access to poor relief was deliberately made 
more shaming and more difficult. The new measure conformed to the laissez-faire 
philosophy which underpinned other social policy (including the advocacy of free 
labour over slavery).100 For reasons practical and philosophical, the Cape did not 
enact a poor law.101 Discouragement of out-of-wedlock births, and the activity 
which produced them, needed other incentives. Chief among those was the mantle 
of respectability which rewarded a timeous marriage. 
Traditionally, churches were concerned with the sin and not, overtly, the sin-
ner’s niche in society. But as the dispensers of charity, they had an interest in their 
members’ self-support: when adulterer Jan Cruywagen left for Durban, his aban-
doned wife brought her neediness to the DRC.102 Female applicants for alimentatie 
who are named in church records, and can be traced in South African Genealogies, 
appear often to have been of slave descent – an indicator, if not a proof, of status 
in terms of ‘race’ and class. 
The coincidence of material need and non-conformance with middle-class 
morality amongst Cape Town’s large ‘mixed-race’ community was a factor in 
the establishment of separate ‘mission’ churches. Racial references had not char-
acterised the reports of the DRC’s Commission of Censure established in 1838 
but they are rife in the records of the Nederduitse Gereformeerde Sendingkerk 
(Dutch Reformed Mission Church) which was founded in 1881 for kleurlinge 
96 Law of Inheritance Commission, viii, xiv-xv, xix; R. Probert, Cretney’s Family Law, 5th edition (London: Sweet & Max-
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(‘Coloureds’).103 When Johanna Kleinschmidt, a married member of that body, 
went alone to the diamond fields at Kimberley she brought back a ‘white’ baby 
which she claimed as her own but not her husband’s.104 Mission Church officer 
Salomon Hendriks – accused of drunkenness and consorting with Muslims – was 
the product of an adulterous ‘white’ mother.105 Those markers ran deeper than mere 
gossip, betraying a sense of boundaries crossed by wayward women and the pre-
dictable social consequences.
Children of Cohabitation and Failed Marriages
For most of human history ‘parental rights were strikingly similar to property 
rights’. Parents controlled their children’s labour and earnings, or choice of a mar-
riage partner.106 The nineteenth century’s closing decades saw the burgeoning of 
orphanages and schools, and curbs on cruelty to children. Those advances were 
hard fought: ‘reformers had to confront the view of parental rights which identified 
patriarchal decision-making with family stability, and this with societal cohesion’. 
Reforms were not intended to alter the stigma attached to cohabitation or illegiti-
macy. To a degree, the institution of marriage retained its status at the expense of 
families formed by the unmarried.107 
The Christian churches and other faith communities admonished cohabiting 
couples to marry and rear their children within the fold of religion. Their cam-
paigns accelerated in the post-emancipation milieu: as said, the DRC established 
a Commission of Censure to monitor its members’ behaviour.108 For Christians, 
inducements to marry were the churches’ power to withhold the sacraments of bap-
tism and communion, and their disbursements of charity. For Muslims and Jews, 
morality was satisfied by each faith’s religious ceremony, even if legality depended 
on a civil marriage in addition. 
Difficult to measure is the influence on marriage choices of a family-friendly 
legal principle: whereas, by English law, a bastard had no reprieve from its status 
as filius nullius (nobody’s child), the Roman-Dutch law legitimated a child if its 
parents wed at some later date (per matrimonium subsequens).109 Upon the mar-
riage, guardianship passed from mother to father.110 Children rescued from illegiti-
macy lived in families which yet were vulnerable to legal complications: a woman 
who married her children’s father, but resided apart as he was abusive, was warned 
103 J. Kinghorn, ‘Modernization and Apartheid: The Afrikaner Churches’ in R. Elphick and R. Davenport, eds, Christianity 
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105 Ibid., 17 Apr. and 16 Oct. 1890.
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that their ‘agreement … was contra bonos mores, and therefore invalid’; the law 
required she restore conjugal rights to her abuser.111
Legitimation qualified the child to inherit equally with any siblings born in 
wedlock, should the father die intestate. Where a father provided for bastards in his 
will, careless wording could negate his intention: a man with surviving offspring 
born both in and out of wedlock left property to ‘my children’ in his testament; 
the latter’s hopes were quashed when his instruction was construed to refer exclu-
sively to those of ‘legitimate’ birth.112 The Cape court was probably familiar with 
the English case, Dorin v Dorin (1875), where a ‘bequest to “our children” was 
held to refer only to legitimate children, even though none existed’.113
Roman-Dutch and English common law shared a strong reluctance to bas-
tardise children born within a marriage: neither husband nor wife could charge 
‘non-access’ when success would have that result.114 Where infidelity was alleged, 
the law decreed pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (the father is whom the mar-
riage shows) – a ‘legal fiction’ which presumed paternity and preserved legitima-
cy.115 That presumption reflected a strong reluctance to burden the child with the 
stigma and loss of rights intrinsic to illegitimacy.116 Charles Bell, who had exer-
cised his paternal right in wresting the infant Catherine from her mother, defied the 
law respecting the last-born child, Charlotte, conceived during the marriage but 
delivered after the divorce for adultery. By so doing he deprived Ebden of a valid 
claim for maintenance.
Whereas Charlotte was bastardised by force majeure, the infant Horak was 
ruled out of wedlock by the law: six months after her marriage, Mrs Horak gave 
birth to a ‘mature and full grown child’. When she was found to have concealed her 
pre-marital pregnancy by another man, the court decided for Horak and granted 
annulment: ‘The basis of the remedy, it would seem is fraud – the attempt to foist 
off another man’s child on an unsuspecting husband.’117 With the marriage recast 
as concubinage, the child was made illegitimate. 
Failed marriages gave rise to bitter contests over custody. A husband’s rights 
were paramount: ‘so long as the marriage was not dissolved by a divorce a vin-
culo matrimonii on account of adultery or malicious desertion, the right to the 
custody of the children by the father is absolute.’118 A mother might be allowed to 
rear daughters, but sons only while young and with the prospect of relinquishing 
them. Dirk Stegman sued for restoration of three children: the court ordered their 
mother to return the two boys and keep their daughter ‘pro tempore, and until fur-
ther order’.119 When the Simeys judicially separated, Mrs Simey was given their 
son, aged seven, on the ground of ‘best interests’ – a concept gaining traction in 
111 Van Osten v Van O., 1923, Howes and Duncan, eds, South African Law Journal, 41, 95.
112 Hahlo, Law of Husband and Wife, 5th ed, 37, see In re Russo (1896) 13 SC 185. The ‘illegitimate’ children would have been 
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such cases. Sometime after, a ‘school-mistress who had taught coloured children’ 
testified on behalf of the father who sued for custody. Her evidence trumped the 
mother’s plea that the boy was ‘the only child left of thirteen’, and backward be-
cause he was ‘delicate’. The court ruled for Simey: ‘Victorian courts thought, and 
said, that they were acting in the best interests of the child when holding that a 
father had the right to decide on his child’s upbringing’.120 
Child murder or abandonment – the desperate measures of women faced with 
unwanted pregnancy – engaged the courts from time to time. Abortion and infan-
ticide were treated as murder by Roman-Dutch law (or as homicide if intent to 
kill could not be proven).121 But without registration of births and deaths, babies 
could be disposed of and, if discovered, a mother could claim that the child had 
been stillborn.122 In 1845, the Cape government tried to close the gap by punishing 
concealment of birth:
… if any woman shall be delivered of a child and shall by secret bury-
ing or otherwise … endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, every such 
woman so offending … and being convicted thereof shall be liable to 
be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding 
five years.123
The act of concealment was the crux, without needing proof if death occurred 
‘before, at, or after’ that event. The ordinance’s efficacy respecting child murder 
may be doubted: during the next quarter-century, trials for infanticide averaged 
one or two per annum.124
Where it could find extenuation, the court showed mercy to women who were 
young, poor, and often in domestic service. A certain Hendrichs denied that she 
had given birth, but an infant’s body was found in the garden. She was acquitted 
of concealment when a midwife and other witnesses swore that the death had been 
natural and, further, it was acknowledged that no law prescribed that the dead be 
buried ‘in a public place’.125 Hannah Solomon’s sentence to hang for infanticide 
was commuted to ten years’ hard labour in the light of her youth and inexperience 
– as was Elizabeth Barrett’s, she being ‘rather simple’ and ‘the Victim of a Vile 
Father’.126 Emmie Morris, an ‘off-coloured young woman’ whose employer testi-
fied on her behalf, was tried for the lesser crime of concealment.127 Child murder – 
a murky factor in the infant mortality rate – fuelled demands for harsh punishment 
where a child died on account of its mother’s ‘neglect’.128 Statistics compiled from 
120 Probert, Cretney’s Family Law, 297; Juta, ed, Cases Decided in the Supreme Court … 1884-5, 3, 1-3. See Britain’s Guard-
ianship of Infants Act 1886.
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information gathered in terms of Act 7 of 1894, which introduced compulsory 
registration of births and deaths, confirmed the presumption that out-of-wedlock 
births contributed disproportionately to infant mortality, and that the mothers most 
often were persons of colour.129
By the end of the century, children’s homes were an option for preserving in-
fant life – though not panaceas for women faced with loss of employment or social 
disgrace. Cape Town’s first orphanage, launched jointly (1815) by the DRC and 
Lutherans, had penalised illegitimacy. The founders proposed
… there to receive, to feed, to clothe, and to educate in a Christian and 
honest manner such needy orphans of both sexes that were or will be 
born from legitimate marriages of Protestant parents, and such without 
distinction of creed, Dutch Reformed as well as Lutheran …130
From 1850, when the Catholic Church established Cape Town’s second or-
phanage, church-initiated institutions for childcare and the reform of prostitutes 
and unwed mothers grew in number.131 Though some admitted out-of-wedlock 
children, they and their mothers were still subject to discrimination: Dr Jane Wa-
terston – Cape Town’s first woman doctor – sponsored maternity services which, 
at century’s end, excluded unmarried mothers (a ban which some contrived to 
outmanoeuvre).132 
It was reprobated that Christian women admitted to ‘Malay’ homes to give 
birth often left their infants to be reared as Muslims.133 The adoption of Christian 
children by Muslim families – more common in Cape Town than elsewhere in the 
Colony – grew as a focus of alarm. When Mrs Mathews gave a child born of her 
adultery ‘to a Malay woman’, her husband sued for divorce and the court com-
mented: ‘There is far too little power of serving the interests of children, the inno-
cent victims … by refusing the decree of divorce’.134 It is unclear how preserving 
the marriage might have enhanced the child’s life chances, beyond its ‘rescue’ as 
a Christian. 
The options for an unwanted child not aborted or done away with at birth 
were likely to be fraught with trauma.
 
‘Race’ and the New ‘Public Interests’ of Society
Increasingly, Cape society was limned by race as well as by class. Cape Town’s 
orphans and abandoned children had long figured among the destitute. Intractable 
cases were housed with the adult chronic sick and paupers – to begin, in what had 
been the Slave Lodge and, afterwards, on Robben Island, historic place of banish-
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Journal of Southern African Studies, 17(3), Sept. 1991, 376-8. The Act to Provide for the Registration of Births and Deaths 
No. 7 of 1894 provided that a man could not be named as father without his consent, pre-empting false claims of paternity; 
when identified, a father was required to support his child to age 15.
130 NGKA, V5 3/1, Notarieële Acte, Suid-Afrikaanse Weeshuis, 1 Sept. 1808.
131 Malherbe, ‘Born into Bastardy’, 34-5.
132 Bickford-Smith, Van Heyningen and Worden, Cape Town in the Twentieth Century, 37-8.
133 Burman and Naude, ‘Bearing a Bastard’, 384.
134 Mathews v M., Cape Law Journal, 10, 285-6; Malherbe, ‘Christian-Muslim Marriage and Cohabitation’, 17.
25
ment in Table Bay.135 The Victorians aligned those children’s status more closely 
with that of ‘juvenile offenders’. 
Parliament was persuaded that parents no longer stand as obstacles to the in-
terests of the (white) child and the state.136 Apprenticeship, an established means of 
relieving guardians of dependent children in their care, was extended by the Cape 
Parliament to the inmates of the new reformatories.137 Next, magistrates were em-
powered to commit poor children to a reformatory where no apprenticeship could 
be found.138 A doctor addressing the Select Committee on the Destitute Children 
Relief Bill remarked: 
We had it in evidence that the lowest class in Cape Town was the 
degraded whites. They were lower than the coloured people … when 
whites and blacks mix together, the blacks push the whites down, and 
if we wish this country to be manipulated by white people it is neces-
sary that those white people should be on a better basis than coloured 
people.139
The resulting Act (1895) linked poverty, race and illicit sex: a destitute child 
was defined as ‘of European parentage’, under age 15, without carers or home, 
found begging or living in a ‘reputed brothel’ – the last elaborated where the child 
was female. Once committed to an institution, such a child could be apprenticed 
so long as he or she was segregated by sex, and ‘from persons not of European 
parentage’.140 
The 1895 Act reflected thinking that privileged ‘poor whites’ amongst the 
underclass. But who was white? Based on the evidence of experts whom it exam-
ined, the Select Committee which framed the Act abandoned attempts to establish 
criteria respecting ‘European parentage’. Asked to define a European child, the 
Superintendent-General of Education responded: ‘We sometimes have two teach-
ers in the same school who cannot agree as to whether a child is European … sup-
pose you have two children of the very same colour, the public make a distinction 
…’ Another witness put it: ‘A line is socially drawn.’141 Shown a path through the 
difficulty, the Cape Parliament entrusted ‘race’ classification to on-the-spot (white) 
officials and the community they represented. 
With attention to race on the increase,142 matrimonial law yet escaped amend-
ment to reflect it. In 1898 Mrs Niemand sued for divorce because of her husband’s 
adultery with a woman who had shared their house for twelve years. The court 
looked with sympathy on her delay in acting, citing her social isolation – her natal 
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family having severed relations since her marriage to ‘a coloured man’.143 Gender 
disparity in the white community was again on the rise: by the 1890s, it appears 
that ‘as much as 15 per cent of marriages in Cape Town were mixed’.144 Niemand’s 
predicament suggests that stigma, so far as it attached to ‘inter-racial’ marriage, 
was greater where the woman in the partnership was white. The Morality Act of 
1902, which banned intercourse between black men and white prostitutes, was the 
Cape’s first racial legislation respecting sex between consenting adults. 
Conclusion
‘Law inevitably fossilises the values of the era in which it was created.’145 In the 
twentieth century, the moral code and features of matrimonial law which had en-
couraged hypocrisy were widely dismissed in popular parlance as ‘Victorian’. For 
Victorian women the ‘double standard’ – entrenched in the law, and the mindsets 
of legal practitioners – raised the risk, with respect to their material welfare and 
reputation, of challenging the system. Notwithstanding, they as well as men took 
their chances with the law where it circumscribed their sexual choices: the Cape 
Colony’s case law includes (as seen) examples of their ingenuity. 
But where English feminists had much to celebrate as the century drew to 
a close – the more exuberantly since they had fought for and won key victories 
themselves146 – there was no equivalent progression at the Cape. Members of the 
Women’s Christian Temperance Union were roused to campaign against ‘the in-
dignity done to women’ by the Contagious Diseases Act of 1885 but they failed to 
sway the lawmakers: the offending Act was only repealed in 1919.147 The Colony’s 
Roman-Dutch law was in some respects less draconian than English common law 
in defining the rights of women and children. In the course of integrating the two 
systems, Cape Victorians were satisfied at first with mainly technical amendments; 
then came the assault on the ‘legitimate portion’. By taking ‘the principle of [a 
man’s] freedom of testation further than any other Western legal system’, the new 
Parliament dealt a blow to dependants.148 
Though, at century’s end, the legal status of children born out of wedlock 
appeared static, the real-life situation of many was being transformed by the shifts 
in attitude which have been traced – notably, respecting race and the child’s ‘best 
interests’. Burman and Naude concluded that when, towards the end of the century, 
attention turned from punishing ‘sin’ to the welfare of the out-of-wedlock child (its 
frequent product), the turnabout owed most to the Medical Officers of Health (first 
appointed in 1894) who wanted Cape Town’s infant mortality statistics to conform 
with figures regarded as acceptable elsewhere. Medical Officers of Health lobbied 
for improvement in conditions of birth and post-natal care – matters on which their 
143 Niemand v N., 3 Aug. 1898, H.T. Tamplin, ed, The Cape Law Journal (Grahamstown, 1898), 15, 269-70.
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opinion was influential.149 Slower to come were legal reforms where the punish-
ment of immorality disadvantaged children deemed ‘illegitimate’, and sometimes 
bastardised the innocent. Amendment of the status quo would be piecemeal and 
cautiously incremental prior to the ‘sexual revolution’ and revisions of family law 
which characterised the late twentieth century.
Cape Town’s population mushroomed in the final decades of the nineteenth 
century. The implications for ‘morality’ of the predominantly male influx raised 
hopes of attracting marriage partners from Europe. That hope was unrealised: the 
reach of The Shield in diverting British women from the Cape, out of abhorrence 
of its Contagious Diseases Act, was probably minimal but the flow of female im-
migrants was disappointing overall and particularly so for southern Africa, with 
Canada, Australia and the United States more attractive to many.150 
A fair share of Britons who made the Cape their home were imbued with am-
bition to overcome the inherited shortfalls, boost the economy and present to the 
world a public face worthy of membership of a mighty empire. The middle class 
of merchants and professionals, clergy and philanthropists vied and collaborated 
to identify and reform activities inimical to that project. That quest, with its focus 
on bodily and moral health, demanded attention to family stability and sexual be-
haviour in public discourse. The quest continued in the new century, when the ten-
dency of Cape legislators and their (mainly white) electors to construe the society 
in racial terms accelerated. 
We are still far from understanding how notions of morality and respectabil-
ity were shaped by factors such as religion, or a self-conscious middle class, in 
the late nineteenth century. This article has explored Victorian Cape Town’s social 
order through the prism of family law – remembering that ‘the law has played a 
part, perhaps a major part, not just in reproducing this social order, but in … con-
stituting and defining’ it.151
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